Accident and design : contemporary debates in risk management

Introduction 1 David Jones & Christopher Hood The meanings of “risk” and “hazard” 2 The risk archipelago 3 So, what is risk management? 6 Dimensions of the risk management debate 8 CHAPTER TWO Anticipation in risk management: a stitch in time? 10 ANTICIPATIONISM VERSUS RESILIENCE 10 ANTICIPATING THE RISKS POSED BY NATURAL PERILS 14 David K.C Jones Introduction 14 Changing views of natural perils 14 Anticipating natural perils 15 The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 22 Problems for progress 25 Conclusion 29 HAZARD ENGINEERING 31 D.I.Blockley Introduction 31 Technical and human factors 31 The balloon model of hazard 34 Hazard engineering 36 Conclusions 38 RESILIENCE, FLEXIBILITY, AND DIVERSITY IN MANAGING THE RISKS OF TECHNOLOGIES 40 David Collingridge Introduction 40 Flexibility and resilience 40 Flexible and inflexible technologies 41 Promoting resilience 43 Conclusions 45 CHAPTER THREE Liability and blame: pointing the finger or nobody’s fault 46 ABSOLUTIONISM VERSUS BLAME 46 CRIMINAL LAW, BLAME AND RISK: CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER 50 Celia Wells Introduction 50 Blaming corporations 50 Legally constructing death 52 Socially constructing death 54 Corporate manslaughter 57 Conclusion 59 THE PROBLEM OF BLAME 61 Tom Horlick-Jones Introduction 61 Targeting and the danger of systemic nets 62 Organizations and failures 63 The social and institutional environment 66 The politics of blame: the Purley rail crash 68 Conclusions 70 BLAME, PUNISHMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT 72 A.Neil Johnston Introduction 72 Blame and responsibility 73 Blaming the victim 74 Blame: guilt and vindication 76 Blame: retribution and deterrence 77 Learning from our mistakes 78 Conclusion 82 CHAPTER FOUR Quantitative risk assessment and risk management: risk policy by numbers 84 THE EXTENT TO WHICH “STATISTICS ARE SIGNS FROM GOD” 84 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT AND DECISIONS ABOUT RISK 87 An essential input into the decision process A.V.Cohen Introduction 87 The nature of risk quantification and its uncertainties 88 How is risk quantification used in decision-making? 92 The decision process: a discussion 93 Are expert estimates useful, even with their qualifications? 94 Do technocratic standards apply in effect although not intention? 95 What forums can most effectively discuss risk estimates? 96 Should the QRA itself be produced from a broader perspective? 96 Conclusions 98 LIMITS TO THE MATHEMATICAL MODELLING OF DISASTERS 99 B.Tof t Introduction 99 Implicit assumptions about risks 101 The open systems paradox 105 Examples of failures 105 The future 107 Conclusion 110 CHAPTER FIVE Designing institutions: a house of cards? 111 THE FEASIBILITY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN RISK MANAGEMENT 111 RISK AND DISASTER: THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS BREAKDOWN IN PLANE CRASHES AND BUSINESS FAILURE 114 David T.H.Weir Systems, failure and guilt 114 Communication failures in catastrophe 118 Hierarchy and frame of reference 119 Instrument failure and on-board social systems 120 Communication factors in business failure 123 Promising opportunities for research 125 CRITERIA FOR THE DESIGN OF HAZARD MITIGATION INSTITUTIONS 127 Edmund Penning-Rowsell Natural hazards and human expectations 127 Institutional design problems for risk and impact reduction 128 Designing better institutions: criteria and choices 132 Assessment 139 CHAPTER SIX Counting the cost 141 RISK REDUCTION, BUT AT WHAT PRICE? 141 IS SAFETY A BY-PRODUCT OF QUALITY MANAGEMENT? 144 Tom Horlick-Jones Introduction 144 The dialectics of safety management 145 What is an acceptable level of safety? 146 The quality management approach 150 Travelling hopefully—rail transport safety in the UK 152 Conclusions 154 RISK MANAGEMENT: AN ECONOMIST’S APPROACH 155 Sir Christopher Foster Introduction 155 Safety economics 156 The value of life 158 Conclusion 160 CHAPTER SEVEN Participation in risk management decisions 161 TO WHAT EXTENT IS RISK MANAGEMENT BEST LEFT TO EXPERTS? 161 TECHNOCRACY, DEMOCRACY, SECRECY AND ERROR 164 Nick Pidgeon Introduction: a sceptic’s view? 164 Three strands of debate: normative, instrumental and substantive 165 Concluding comments 171 RISK MANAGEMENT, POST-NORMAL SCIENCE, AND EXTENDED PEER COMMUNITIES Silvio O.Funtowicz & Jerome R.Ravetz 172 Introduction 172 Post-normal science 173 Extended peer communities 177 Conclusion 180 EXPLORING THE ROLE OF CIVIC SCIENCE IN RISK MANAGEMENT 182 Timothy O’Riordan Science in flux 182 The rise of civic science 183 The incorporation of civic science in risk management 186 Civic science and emerging trends in risk management 188 Conclusion 192 CHAPTER EIGHT The regulatory target: products and structures— or people and organizations? 193 SHOULD REGULATION BE TARGETED ON PHYSICAL PRODUCTS OR INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES? 193 RISK AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE OF PROCESS-BASED REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN EUROPE. 195 Simon Shohet Introduction 195 Background 196 Contentions in the risk-regulation debate 197 Product regulation 198 Background to current process regulation of biotechnology in Europe 199 The debate on product versus process legislation 200 Which regulatory policy is the right one? 201 Conclusion 204 CHAPTER NINE Conclusion: learning from your desk lamp 205 HOMEOSTATIC VERSUS COLLIBRATIONIST APPROACHES TO RISK MANAGEMENT 205 WHERE EXTREMES MEET: “SPRAT” VERSUS “SHARK” IN PUBLIC RISK MANAGEMENT 208 Christopher Hood “No workable alternative” to conventional risk engineering? 208 The conventional “SPRAT” approach to risk management 209 An alternative “SHARK” approach to risk management 210 Strengths and weaknesses of SPRAT-type management systems 211 Strengths and weaknesses of SHARK-type management systems 214 Three general operational implications of SHARK as an institutional model of risk management 216 Five specific conditions for the SHARK strategy 220 Conclusion 225 Bibliography 229 Index 245