مدیریت فساد و سود در کشورهای توسعه یافته و در حال ظهور Corruption and earnings management in developed and emerging countries

1. Introduction A broad definition of corruption depicts it as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016, p. 36). The wide-ranging negative effects of corruption are legion. They include constrained economic growth, decreased trust in government and reduced legitimacy of market economy and democracy (Branco and Delgado, 2012). Given its detrimental effects, corruption is considered by many as a cancer on society (Everett et al., 2007). A little over 10 years ago, Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) expressed his dismay regarding the lack of interest evidenced by the economic and accounting literature on the impact of corruption on accounting quality. This consequence has remained largely unexplored in that literature (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Riahi-Belkaoui and AlNajjar, 2006). Motivated by this scarcity, we analyse the relationship between country-level and firm-level characteristics and the level of earnings management of foreign firms with American Depositary Receipts (ADR) in the US market, highlighting the role of corruption as a determinant of earnings management (a measure of accounting quality). Earnings management is related to managers’ judgement in financial reporting and the structuration of transactions with a view to altering financial information to either misguide some stakeholders regarding the underlying economic reality or to influence the outcomes of contracts that are dependent upon such information (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). It may occur for a variety of reasons, including influencing the perceptions of stock market participants, enhancing management compensation, reducing the likelihood of violation of lending agreements and avoiding intervention from regulatory agencies (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Dichev et al. (2013) reported evidence suggesting that roughly 20 per cent of public firms engage in earnings management, and that the usual management borders on 10 per cent of the earnings per share. Many consider that higher levels of earnings management are tantamount to unethical practices (Elias, 2002; Kaplan, 2001; Martin et al., 2016). A moral judgement is unquestionably involved in earnings management (Martin et al., 2016). Despite this and the long history of research on earnings management (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Walker, 2013), accounting researchers have left almost untouched the relationship between earnings management and corruption, undoubtedly one of the most conspicuous and damaging unethical behaviours of our times; this happened even though corruption is considered a serious problem and accounting is deemed as useful in the fight against it (Everett et al., 2007). Few studies have explored the relationship between the level of corruption and accounting quality (Kimbro, 2002; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Wu, 2005; Riahi-Belkaoui and AlNajjar, 2006; Malaguen˜o et al., 2010; Houqe and Monem, 2016). Of these studies, only Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) and Riahi-Belkaoui and AlNajjar (2006) examine the impact of corruption on accounting quality, albeit based on accounting country-level data and without guaranteeing that the study is conducted in a setting of relatively stable accounting environment.