چهره قابل تغییر گزارش حسابرس: پیامد های کارپردازان و کاربران اظهارنامه های مالی The Changing Face of the Auditor’s Report: Implications for Suppliers and Users of Financial Statements

The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) recently finalised significant and far-reaching reforms of the audit reporting model. For the first time, audit reports will provide insights into matters of significance to the audit (IAASB 2015a). For many jurisdictions, audit reports will now provide the name of the audit engagement partner and an explicit statement affirming the independence of the auditor. The audit report will also provide enhanced information on going concern. Another revolutionary change is the reporting of the consideration by auditors of other information in the annual report (IAASB 2015b). Lastly, the structure of the audit report and the order in which the elements are presented will be prescribed to the extent that the auditor’s opinion and basis of opinion section will be presented before all other elements. The Deputy Chairman of the IAASB, Daniel Montgomery (2014), describes the reforms as one of the most significant developments in the auditing profession in many years. The current reforms are driven by long-standing debates on the form, content and value of the audit report (Commission on Auditor’s Responsibilities 1978; Geiger 1993; Church et al. 2008; Smieliauskas et al. 2008; Mock et al. 2013). In particular, the standardised form and restrictive content of the existing audit report have beenfound to limititsinformational and communicative value (Coram et al. 2011; Vanstraelen et al. 2012). There is also evidence of significant perceptual differences between auditors and users with respect to the messages conveyed by the extant audit report (Innes et al. 1997; Gay et al. 1998; McEnroe and Martens 1998; Manson and Zaman 2001; Schelluch and Gay 2006; Chong and Pflugrath 2008; Gray et al. 2011; Asare and Wright 2012; Gold et al. 2012). The financial crisis of 2008–2009 provided further evidence of the limitations of the existing audit reporting model and increased the urgency for reform (Carson et al. 2013; Doogar et al. 2015). The primary objective of the current reform is to enhance the communicative value of the audit report (IAASB 2015a). Investors and other users have called for the audit report to be more informative, and particularly for auditors to provide more relevant information on the audit (CFA Institute 2010). For example, a report published by the CFA Institute reveals that only 37% of respondents to their survey believe that the current audit report contains the right amount of information (CFA Institute 2010). The IAASB argues that the reforms will enhance the informative value of the audit report and audit quality (IAASB 2013). Whether actively or passively fostered, there is controversy about the recent audit report reforms. There are concerns that the reforms will add complexity and length, but not value, to auditor reporting (ICAA 2013; Ghandar 2014). There are also reservations about whether it is truly known what users want and whether additional information will meet their needs (AICD 2013; AUASB 2013). Furthermore, it is argued that additional information such as the name of the audit engagement partner will not influence audit quality or improve the ability of investors to make decisions (E&Y 2014; PwC 2014). There are also concerns that the reform will add to the cost of audits and auditors’ legal liability (NZAuASB 2013; Turner 2013). The impact on cost is likely to be more onerous on small and medium entities and audit practices (IFAC SMP 2013; EFAA 2013). Given these controversies, it is important to examine whether the audit report reforms will improve the value and quality of audits.