علوم روانشناختی در هستی شناسی سه بعدی Psychological Science within a Three-Dimensional Ontology

Ontology and Psychology Ontology is that part of philosophy which deals with questions about the nature of what exists, and how different aspects of being are related to each other. Examples of ontological questions directly relevant to psychology are: What is the nature of consciousness, sensation, perception, memory, thinking, feeling, intention, expectation, will, desire, hope, fear, joy, sadness, love, anger, empathy, etc.? Or, to turn to more theoretical concepts: What is the nature of human information processing, personality, personal identity, interpersonal relations, etc.? And how are all these things related to each other, and to the nonpsychological (physical, chemical, biological, social, etc.) world? Traditional questions in this area are formulated in terms of how the Bmind^ is related to (1) external reality, (2) the body, (3) the brain, (4) language, and (5) human society and culture. One classical philosophical position, often traced to Descartes, is that of mind-body dualism. According to dualistic thinking, mind and body represent different kinds of realities (Bsubstances^, in Descartes’ thinking). Pérez-Álvarez (2017) argues forcibly against dualism, and in favor of pluralism. A pluralistic ontology, he says, Bdoes not reduce reality to two substances (dualism) or to one (monism). Realities have many forms: experiential (pain, feelings, thoughts), physical (electrons, atoms, cells, organisms, typewriters, planets), institutional (languages, cultures, family relationship systems, collective imaginaries, world views) and abstract (mathematics, theorems, theories, geometry).^ The position in favor of pluralism that is first taken by Pérez-Álvarez (2017) is later qualified in at least two different ways: (1) first by abandoning Bstrong pluralism^ in favor of a Btripartite^ ontology, which implies a reduction of a potentially pluralistic universe into three different Bworlds^, and then (2) by qualifying this tripartite ontology by a streak of monism, in the sense that one of these Bthree worlds^ (i.e., physical reality) is seen as more basic than the others (materialism). In both of these aspects he follows Bueno’s philosophical materialism, which involves three Bgenres of materiality^: (1) the physical world, including all kinds of material bodies from electrons to planets (M1); (2) the subject with its subjective experiences and behavioral activity (M2); and (3) abstract entities, such as concepts, mathematics, social institutions, and cultural things (M3).