استراتژی های قیمت توسط اپراتور تور آلمان و بریتانیا در مالورکا  Price strategies by German and British tour operators in Mallorca

1. Introduction The European tour operator market is a mature one dominated by German and British tour operators, and so, their behaviour largely determines the prices of package holidays at many Mediterranean destinations. The market structure of the German and British tour operator markets has the features of an oligopoly (Bastakis, Buhalis, & Butler, 2004; Baum & Mudami, 1994; Evans & Stabler, 1995; Long & Shi, 2017): 1) In both markets, a limited number of large tour operators compete with one another, alongside numerous small tour operators who do not compete with the major ones (Davies & Downward, 2007, for the British market). 2) The large tour operators’ high market concentration (over 50% of the market) gives them market power (the capacity to set prices above the marginal costs). 3) At the same time, tour operators stand out for their strategic interrelations. This means that tour operator price strategies take into account rival behaviour and these strategies will vary, depending on the economic context. A price strategy is a long-term framework for setting basic prices, whereby an initial price is set for a product together with the proposed direction of price movements across the product lifecycle (Lamb, Hair, & McDaniel, 2002). Hence it is a strategic decision that must take into account the behaviour of rival companies and it must be adapted to fit in with different economic scenarios during the product lifecycle. “A key element of the marketing strategy is companies’ pricing strategy” (Kim, Natter, & Spann, 2009, p. 44). Price strategies do not only generate more benefits for the tour operator; they also constitute a key negotiating tool among agents in the tourism sector (Falzon, 2012). Consequently, familiarity with tour operator price strategies, the type of price competition in which they engage, and the changes in price strategies that they make when an economic crisis occurs can contribute to the design of better tourism price negotiation policies at destinations. The better understanding of tour operators’ price strategies should contribute to a better price negotiation by the accommodation sector. Over the years, tour operators have used different price strategies. For instance, until the early 1990s, the structure of the UK tour operator market was oligopolistic with price stability (Baum & Mudami, 1994). However, this price stability could easily be dashed given the fragility of its coordination, due to mistrust and uncertainty of its conjectural variations. Consequently, implicit price agreements might easily be broken, heralding the beginning of a price war. Evans and Stabler (1995) confirm the occurrence of price wars during this period due to the existence of strategic groups and uncooperative behaviour among UK tour operators. At the same time, given the low number of major tour operators (in both the British and German markets), this could theoretically also lead to a price leadership situation, with one tour operator acting as the market leader and setting benchmark prices while all the others act as followers. Because this is a mature market, non-price competition (package differentiation, advertising, quality variation) is also a possibility, which would lead to market segmentation (for instance, the family or adults-only segments) and, by extension, to less aggressive price competition. Given all the above, diverse price strategies can be used by tour operators, and it is even possible for these strategies not to revolve around prices.