افشای مسئولیت اجتماعی شرکت و ارزش بازار: شرکت های خانوادگی در مقابل شرکت های غیر خانوادگی Corporate social responsibility disclosure and market value: Family versus nonfamily firms

1. Introduction The public’s growing awareness of CSR-related issues is putting increasing pressure on firms to communicate their CSR efforts through non-mandatory and mandatory disclosure to ensure that stakeholders are aware of the appropriateness of their actions taken on social and environmental issues (Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995). Many companies have allocated resources and efforts to disclose extensive information about CSR issues in their annual report or standalone sustainability report. Such disclosure conveys information that is useful to address the needs of multiple stakeholder groups, especially financial ones such as shareholders (Jamali, 2008; Wang & Li, 2015). The question of the potential value of CSR disclosure for shareholders has attracted growing interest in academic research. Many studies examine the usefulness of CSR disclosure for shareholders by analyzing the impact of voluntary CSR disclosure on firm market value. Although CSR disclosure conveys value-relevant information to various capital market participants (shareholders, investors, potential shareholders and financial analysts), CSR disclosure and its appreciation by capital market participants are still incomplete and questionable (Cahan, De Villiers, Jeter, Naiker, & Van Staden, 2016). From an agency perspective, CSR reporting may represent an opportunistic maneuver by managers, and may thus reduce shareholders’ wealth (Friedman, 1970). Indeed, managers enjoy full discretion over what to report on CSR issues. As a result, CSR information disclosed may not reflect firms’ CSR performance (Luo, Lan, & Tang, 2012). In these settings, shareholders need to apply filters to assess the credibility of voluntary CSR information (Cho, Guidry, Hageman, & Patten, 2012). In this study, we examine whether family status of firms matters in the relevance of voluntary CSR reporting. Moving beyond agency theory, we build our argument on the fact that family firms have some characteristics that can be considered relevant when shareholders assign value to CSR information. Stakeholder groups place great value on ownership identity when making market valuation decisions (Granata & Chirico, 2010; Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Indeed, family firms are characterized by their favorable reputation, which is shaped by firms’ actions toward stakeholders (Dyer & Whetten, 2006), along with higher levels of corporate social performance and ethical behavior (McGuire, Dow, & Ibrahim, 2012), and strong social and stakeholder orientation posture (Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). These particularities seem to positively influence stakeholders’ response to family firms’ CSR claims. Family firms may capitalize on their stakeholders’ positive perception, relative to that of nonfamily firms, because these firms are seen as trustworthy and are perceived to have high source credibility (Stanley & McDowell, 2014; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). Family firms differ from nonfamily firms in the nature of their relationship with external stakeholders. They are more attentive to addressing external stakeholders’ expectations and less inclined to act in ways that would violate a business partner’s trust (Cennamo et al., 2012). This in turn favors a high level of confidence in the family firm and probably has a positive impact on the effects of their CSR communication. Our study focuses on the French context. Exploring the challenges of CSR voluntary disclosure in the French context by comparing family and nonfamily firms provides an interesting institutional setting for empirical analysis, for at least three reasons. First, the usefulness of CSR reporting may vary across countries depending on the country-specific context (e.g., Cahan et al., 2016; Cormier & Magnan, 2007). Hence, our results provide evidence of a new institutional context, given that the present literature is based specifically on Anglo-American countries (Reverte, 2009). Second, the French stock market is dominated by the presence of family-controlled firms; the proportion of family listed firms is one of the highest in the world, at more than 70% (Nekhili, Chakroun, & Chtioui, 2016). Third, France is one of the few countries to have enacted legislation requiring the disclosure of social and environmental information (Chauvey, Giordano-Spring, Cho, & Patten, 2015). Our analysis starts in 2001, the year of the implementation of the New Economic Regulations (NER) Act. Article 116 of the NER Act establishes that listed French companies in a regulated market must submit data on the environmental and social consequences of their activities in their management report (Chelli, Durocher, & Richard, 2014). In addition, our study was conducted prior to the Grenelle II Act, which took effect in 2012. This act extended the non-financial reporting system introduced by the NER Act, which required listed companies to mention key indicators of non-financial performance relating to social, environmental and sustainability activities in their reports. Neither law imposes penalties for non-compliance (Chelli et al., 2014). To measure CSR reporting, we developed a content analysis index based on items as defined by the French Grenelle II Act in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines. Disclosure by French companies in accordance with the GRI guidelines between 2001 and 2011 was done on a totally voluntary basis (Chelli, Durocher, & Fortin, 2016). Further, analyzing the period following the first compulsory provides much richer and more extensive information on CSR duties than does the preceding period (Reverte, 2009).