سرمایه انسانی و استقامت استراتژیک: بازرسی کارگران کم کار در دو اقتصاد نوظهور  Human capital and strategic persistence: An examination of underperforming workers in two emerging  economies

1. Introduction Over the past three decades, multiple streams of research have examined the productivity of workers and strategies to achieve better employee performance (Al Ariss, Cascio, & Paauwe, 2014; Yi, Nataraajan, & Gong, 2011). One stream of research has focused on human capital development and skills upgrading as effective mechanisms for ensuring efficient utilisation of employees (Barnes, Ponder, & Hopkins, 2015; Hayek, Thomas, Novicevic, & Montalvo, 2016; Mellahi & Collings, 2010). Today’s highly competitive global environment has made competition for top talent a priority for many multinationals and small businesses in both developed and developing economies, thereby creating a hostile environment for underperformance (Amankwah-Amoah, Nyuur, & Ifere, 2016; Collings & Mellahi, 2009). Many firms have utilised incentives such as higher salary and bonuses to attract and retain top talents as well as encourage superior job performance (Henagan & Bedeian, 2009). At the same time, some firms persist with underperforming workers and even refrain from taking steps to weed out underperforming workers (Mmieh, Mordi, Singh, & Asiedu-Appiah, 2011; Shein, 2011; Taylor, 1998). Although the labour market in many advanced economies such as the US and Canada are associated with a “pay-forperformance” culture to motivate employees to achieve optimum outcome (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2011), in many emerging economies “underperforming employees are typically left in post for several months or even years before any action is taken to address them” (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2011, p. 1705). Despite decades of research by international business and strategy scholars on emerging economies, the existing literature has remained relatively silent as to why firms and managers persist with underperforming employees even under threat of worsening performance. The largely unexplored nature of this issue in emerging market context is puzzling given that the existence of underperforming workers can undermine the contribution levels of fellow workers (Wagner-Tsukamoto, 2007). More importantly, star performers can become targets of underperformers, who can engage in acts to undermine their progress and success (see Henagan & Bedeian, 2009; Fiske, 2011). Our purpose in this study is to examine why firms persist with underperforming workers in emerging economies. We focus specifically on two emerging economies in Africa: Ghana and Nigeria, to shed light on the subject. The two countries are often regarded as the gateways to West Africa. This paper makes three main contributions to strategic human resources, international business and strategy research. First, although past studies have examined skill formation (Mellahi & Collings, 2010), they have failed to offer any robust explanations as to why firms persist with underperforming employees. In this direction, we integrate the concept of the paradox of success (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000),legitimacy literature (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995) and “too much invested to quit” perspective (Teger, 1980) to develop a unified explanation for strategic persistence with underperforming workers. Another contribution is that we integrate insights on the effects of institutional and social pressures on human resource practices (See Chiang & Birtch, 2010; Hayek et al., 2016; Thomas & Inkson, 2007) with firm-level factors to develop an integrated framework of factors to explain persistence with underperforming workers. In addition, although firms that operate in high relational contexts are affected by different institutional factors (Peng, 2014), to date, studies have not incorporated these into our understanding of underperformance. Exploring this issue would help to not only enrich our cross-cultural understanding, but shed light on the more intricate processes through which strategic persistence occurs. In so doing, we capture the various factors that help to explain persistence with underperforming workers. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we present a review of the literature on the paradox of success, “too much invested to quit” perspective, nepotism and legitimacy. The research context and method are then examined. We then set out our findings on underperforming workers. The final section outlines the implications for managers and international business research.