بررسی رابطه بین مسئولیت اجتماعی شرکت راهبردی و عملکرد شرکت: تحلیل بهترین اعضای شرکت Examining the Link between Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility and Company Performance: An Analysis of the Best Corporate Citizens

Introduction IN RECENT YEARS, COMPANIES IN GENERAL AND PUBLICLY HELD COMPANIES IN PARTICULAR HAVE INCREASINGLY BEEN HELD accountable for the social consequences of their business activities such that they are expected to move beyond their focus on financial performance and legal requirements to satisfy the needs of various non-shareholding stakeholders (Coombs and Gilley, 2005; Collison et al., 2008). The demand for heightened corporate attention to corporate social responsibility (CSR) has come from disparate groups that include customers, employees, community, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These groups, none of whose primary benefit from the company is derived from investment returns, tend to focus on issues that are important to both the success of the company and to the well-being of society at large (Choi and Wang, 2009; Doh et al., 2010). However, the financial crisis that has swept through the business world recently has put these types of initiatives under much closer scrutiny in terms of the business benefits received from supporting the demands of non-shareholding stakeholder groups; decision-making concerning CSR initiatives has been increasingly focused on providing tangible returns to the company (Chiu and Sharfman, 2009). While most companies accept the need for CSR, the dramatic change in the global economic climate has led companies to ask themselves whether the prevailing approaches to CSR allow them to enhance their stakeholder relationships and, if so, whether these approaches to CSR are advantageous in terms of corporate performance (CP). The basic issue that confronts the company executives is whether companies ‘do well by doing good’ and, if so, how (Dobers and Springett, 2010). A review of the prevailing approaches companies take to CSR revealed that CSR efforts are ‘so fragmented and so disconnected from business and strategy as to obscure many of the greatest opportunities for companies to benefit the society’ (Porter and Kramer, 2006, p. 4). Werbel and Wortman (2000, p. 125) noted that companies primarily used corporate investments in social causes as a short-term strategy to overcome a negative reputation and that their support for CSR initiatives was a ‘haphazard, reflexive response to short-term challenges’. Observations of this nature lend support to the critics of CSR, who have long argued that company investments in socially responsible but unprofitable initiatives are unsustainable. Failure to supplement CSR initiatives with economic considerations may be why many companies view them as a ‘non-productive cost’ (Murray and Montanari, 1986) or as a ‘tax or license for doing business’ (Peloza, 2006). The limitations of prevailing approaches to CSR, coupled with the present economic crisis, mean that managers must develop highly focused and meaningful forms of CSR initiatives that demonstrably maximize profit by increasing corporate goodwill (Ditlev-Simonson and Midttun, 2011). In response to the criticisms of and concerns about CSR, Porter and Kramer (2006) proposed that the economic objectives of the firm and the objectives of CSR initiatives need not be separate and distinct. Instead of focusing on the ‘tension between business and society’, companies should understand the interdependence between the two and anchor their CSR initiatives in their company-specific strategies and activities. When companies approach CSR in this way, they ‘discover that CSR can be much more than a cost, a constraint, or a charitable deed – it can be a source of opportunity, innovation and competitive advantage’ (Porter and Kramer, 2006, p. 4). Taking such an approach to CSR is also justified by theory. Particularly relevant here are the unique relationships among the top company executives, the board of directors, and the firm’s stakeholders, which relationships form the basis of stakeholder-agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Although top executives in general, and the CEO in particular, directly control firm-level decisions, their actions are also monitored and influenced by the board of directors, who represent all stakeholders (Coombs and Gilley, 2005; Lucas, 2010; Mallin and Michelon, 2011). In addition, how stakeholder relationships are built is likely to be derived from the values embedded in a company’s culture (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004). Hemingway and Maclagan (2004) addressed this issue by explaining how this agency relationship affects a company’s decision to channel its CSR resources to objectives that link the CSR initiatives to the likely preferences of the shareholders. The objective of this study is to examine empirically whether CSR initiatives have a greater impact on company performance if the company prioritizes its CSR initiatives based on the preferences of the stakeholders and channels resources to these initiatives in a strategic way than if it approaches CSR based on generic rationale that are unrelated to stakeholder preferences. Using data collected by Kinder, Lyndenberg, Domini Analytics, Inc. (KLD) during 2005, 2006, and 2007, this study examines the relationship between CP and CSR activities that target each of seven stakeholder groups. In doing so, this study focuses on an important yet underemphasized aspect of the CSR-CP research in order to address the question of whether companies can approach CSR in a way that both benefits society and provides tangible returns to the company. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development There are many ways to create CSR initiatives that give value to stakeholders, but because stakeholder management involves close interaction with a number of diverse yet interrelated groups, the process is inherently complex (Goll and Rasheed, 2004). When companies have fewer resources to devote to CSR initiatives, those responsible for corporate governance (the top executives and the board of directors) must determine which stakeholder groups to consider, in what order, and to what extent (Ruf et al., 2001; Van Beurden and Gössling, 2008). Once the firm’s stakeholders have been identified and prioritized, the firm must link its CSR initiatives to the preferences of one or more groups of stakeholders. A number of researchers (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2004; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Melo and Garrido-Morgado, 2011) have argued that channeling a firm’s CSR initiatives to the objectives its directors and top executives favor strengthens the firm’s long-term competitiveness and CP. Following the resource-based view of the firm, researchers have regarded a firm’s positive relationships with its stakeholders as valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable resources that contribute to the company’s performance advantage (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Choi and Wang, 2009; Melo and Garrido-Morgado, 2011). A company’s decision to base how it channels its resources based on stakeholder preferences leads to a performance advantage for the firm (Alniacick et al., 2011). For example, a sound relationship with employees – a stakeholder group – may increase the firm’s ability to attract and retain employees and increase employee commitment and effort, leading to improved efficiency and productivity. Similarly, a good relationship with customers, another stakeholder group, may lead to a more stable and attached customer base and enhance brand value (Brown and Dacin, 1997), and a good relationship with the community may lead to positive community involvement in providing infrastructure and support for the company’s growth (Fombrun et al., 2000; Epstein and Widen, 2011). Previous researchers have also noted that targeted CSR initiatives help to build a positive reputation with various stakeholder groups (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2004; Melo and Garrido-Morgado, 2011; Michelon, 2011), which is associated with positive financial performance. A positive reputation has a particularly enduring effect because of the inability of competitors to imitate it (Alniacick et al., 2011). CSR initiatives that are prioritized based on strategic concerns have often been described by researchers as ‘investments’ comparable to those made in R&D or employee training because such initiatives lead to future growth potential in the same way (Fombrun et al., 2000). Prioritization can also give a company advantages in identifying trends or changes that are taking place in the market, allowing the company to act quickly to establish itself at the forefront of the change (Falck and Heblich, 2007). Finally, such CSR initiatives may help the company build competencies proactively by improving its scanning skills, processes, and systems that increase the organizational preparedness for change, turbulence, and crises (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Welford et al., 2007). Managing the CSR initiatives of the firm in terms of doing things better than and differently from how competitors do them can contribute to competitive success in the same way that other aspects of competitive strategy do (Porter and Kramer, 2006). More than ever before, strategic considerations of externalities are critical to a company’s competitive performance. By linking the CSR initiatives to the likely preferences of the stakeholders and channeling company CSR resources to objectives favored by top management and directors, companies can ensure that their corporate capabilities will be particularly suited to helping create value for the stakeholder groups whose needs they are trying to address (Ruf et al., 2001; Porter and Kramer, 2002). Therefore, it is proposed that: H1: Firms whose CSR activities are prioritized based on strategic concerns see a more positive relationship between CSR and CP than other firms do.