سیاست های (قدرت) مرزی دوباره متولد شده در بحران پناهندگان: خطوط رقابتی (مورد نزاع) مرزبندی و ظهور مجدد تعارض هویت : مورد صربستان و کرواسی Border (Power) Politics Reborn in the Refugee Crisis: Contested Lines of Demarcation and the Re-emergence of Identity Conflicts: The Case of Serbia and Croatia

The refugee crisis of 2015 and 2016 has brought the region of the Western Balkans back into the international news headlines. For months the so-called ‘Western Balkans-Route’ was a major arterial road for refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan with the ultimate goal of reaching Germany and other Western European countries. The already fragile and rather unstable Western Balkans states have struggled to cope with the mass influx of refugees, which has resulted both in the appearance of new demarcation and identity conflict lines as well as the emergence of new nationalisms throughout the region. The closure of the Croatian and Serbian border in fall 2015, during the peak of the refugee crisis, reinforced old animosities and enhanced conflicting rhetoric. From the beginning of the crisis Southeastern Europe has witnessed the erection of new fences on the border between Slovenia and Croatia, between Macedonia and Greece, etc. This has sparked debates about the consequences of new border regimes, both on regional stability and cooperation, as well as on broader issues such as EU-integration, national identities and the further development of democracy in the region. Against the background of the recent refugee crisis, in this chapter I argue that since fall 2015, developments in the Western Balkans have contributed to the re-emergence of concepts of borders and demarcations in the political realm. I use consciously the terms ‘re-emergence’ as the events and debates relate directly to the discourses and narratives of the early 1990s. Or to put it more precisely, the 1990s are the birth-place of border (power) politics in the Balkans, while recent events can be described as a prolongation and a re-birth under new circumstances. In any case, following a period of enhanced and intensified regional cooperation and normalization since 2000 (at least between Croatia and Serbia, but also more broadly), the recent refugee crisis has re-opened and re-fueled old identity conflict lines thus contributing to an increase in nationalist rhetoric and behavior. More substantially, the refugee crisis and subsequent events have contributed to the reaffirmation of borders and thus the strengthening of exclusive nation-state concepts in the Balkans. Here I argue that the process of political instrumentalization of (ethnic/national) differences and borders (real and discursive ones) between the states in the Balkans based on nationalism and old identity conflict lines from the 1990s can be described as a border (power) politics. I describe this kind of border politics as power politics, alluding to the ultimate goal that is pursued by political (nationalist) elites in the region, which is basically equal to remaining in power. Based on theoretical thoughts on nationalism, the following chapter aims at (a) establishing a conceptual model to explain the continued importance of nationalism, and consequently of border (power) politics in the region based on Rogers Brubaker’s relational argument, (b) sketching out the newly emerged border (power) politics in the regional context of Southeastern Europe based on the conflict over refugees between Croatia and Serbia in fall 2015, and (c) uncovering the structure of newly emerging political battles and identity discourses surrounding the concept of borders and demarcations between countries in the Western Balkans. This chapter draws on an extensive analysis both of the general literature on nationalism as well as the regional literature on the effects and consequences of nationalism in the Western Balkans. The case study on Serbia and Croatia during the course of the refugee crisis is based on an analysis of statements of policymakers, as well as content analysis of media reporting in major regional news outlets.