زنجیره پیوستاری مفهومی و نظری تفکرات استراتژیک Strategic Thinking: A Continuum of Views and Conceptualisation

ABSTRACT In the 1990s a debate has evolved as to whether strategy should be practiced as art, science or a combination of both. Leading writers in the descriptive and integrative literature such as Ohmae (1982), Mintzberg (1994) and Stacey (1993) among others have argued that strategy should be practiced mainly as an intuitive, creative and divergent thought process – strategy as art. Writers in the prescriptive literature including Andrews (1965), Ansoff (1965) and Porter (1980, 1985, 1990) have been used to support the view that strategy is a rational, analytical, convergent thought process – strategy as science. Several writers, particularly in the later part of the 1990s, have argued that strategy should combine both approaches to achieve the best outcomes (Wilson, 1994, 1998; Raimond, 1996; Liedtka, 1998a, 1998b; Heracleous, 1998). Careful examination of the contributions of the various leading writers and placing them on a strategy as art/strategy as science continuum provides an interesting insight into the literature and the latest developments in the strategy field. These insights are used to assist preparation of a conceptualisation and model of strategic thinking. 2 INTRODUCTION Gluck, Kaufman and Walleck (1980) refer to the evolution of the strategy paradigm observing the strategic planning phase in the 1970s and the strategic management phase in the 1980s. Stacey (1993) and Heracleous (1998) both note there is a view in the literature that the paradigm has now moved on to the strategic thinking phase in the 1990s. Terminology in the strategy field is highly contentious with different writers using the terms strategic planning and strategic management in different ways. The introduction of the term strategic thinking to the strategy literature has served to create further confusion with a strong debate at present on what actually constitutes strategic thinking. One view in this debate which relies on the descriptive and integrative strategy literature is that in an uncertain business environment successful business strategies flow from a process which is essentially eastern (Raimond, 1996), intuitive, creative, divergent and right brain (Ohmae, 1982; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Mintzberg, 1994). This approach is analysed in this working paper as strategy as art. Another view grounded in the prescriptive strategy literature (Andrews, 1965; Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1980) is that in a more stable business environment a western (Raimond, 1996), left brain, analytical, convergent approach to strategy is most effective. Finally, there is a view that there is a need for the practice of both strategy as art and strategy as science to engage effectively in strategic thinking (Wilson, 1994,1998; Raimond, 1996; Liedtka, 1998a; Heracleous, 1998). This perspective balances the input of prescriptive, descriptive and integrative contributions to the literature. Careful examination of the views of the various leading writers in the paradigm and positioning their offerings on a strategy as art/strategy as science or right brain/left brain continuum (refer Diagram 1-Leading Writers and the Strategic Thinking Continuum) gives a revealing insight into the literature in this field. It is also particularly helpful in conceptualising strategic thinking and formulating a model for further research. STRATEGY AS ART There is a view in the field that strategic planning and strategic thinking are two quite different modes of thought and that strategic thinking should precede strategic planning (Heracleous, 1998). Proponents of this view of strategic thinking assert that strategic planning cannot effectively develop strategy as it is programmed, formalised and analytical. Rather successful business strategies flow from a particular mental approach which is essentially intuitive and creative rather than rational (Ohmae, 1982) as logic can be more of a hindrance than an aid to effective strategy formulation (Mintzberg, 1994). This is not to say that there is no place for logic (Ohmae, 1982), rather it is the relative level of input of logic compared with creativity (Ohmae, 1982; Mintzberg, 1994) and the timing of this input (Mintzberg, 1994). In this context Mintzberg argues (1994, p. 107): “Strategic planning, as it has been practiced, has really been strategic programming, the articulation and elaboration of strategies, or visions that already exist.” In the wider management literature both Albrecht (1994) and Kinni (1994) have been similarly critical of strategic planning. Ohmae opens the debate with his descriptive 1982 text The Mind of the Strategist adopting a position on the right brain/left brain continuum favouring the benefits of intuition and creativity over hard analysis. With regard to the relative use of intuition and analysis Ohmae (1982, p. 13-14) provides some flexibility for the strategic thinker: “…the most reliable means of dissecting a situation into its constituent parts and reassembling them in the desired pattern is not a step-by-step methodology such as systems analysis. Rather it is that ultimate nonlinear thinking tool, the human brain. True strategic thinking contrasts sharply with the conventional mechanic systems approach based on linear thinking. But it also contrasts with the approach that stakes everything on intuition, reaching conclusions without any real breakdown or analysis…the best possible solutions come from a combination of rational analysis, based on the real nature of things, and imaginative reintegration of all the different items into a new pattern, using nonlinear brainpower.” ۵ In this way the strategist is best equipped to deal with the need to frame objectives, and address opportunities and threats presented by the contextual environment, customers and markets. On the continuum of views it appears most appropriate to position Ohmae (1982) to the right of centre, favouring intuition over analysis, with some flexibility for the practicing manager allowing the use of logic where necessary. A significant observation here is that Ohmae’s (1982) view of systems analysis appears at odds with the offerings of other writers (Stacey, 1993; Liedtka, 1998a, 1998b) discussed later in this working paper. Writing in the same year Peters and Waterman (1982, pp. 32-33) make the pertinent observation that: “Before the rise of the analytic model, the seat-of-the-pants technique was all there was. And it was wholly inadequate for dealing with a complex world.” This perspective is reinforced in the decision making literature (Langley, 1995) and is a key observation in attempting to conceptualise strategic thinking. In this context Peters and Waterman (1982) acknowledge a role for analysis in business management, however, they argue that analysis has been overdone. Peters and Waterman (1982) see the need for the firm to search for the best available path for the organisation to follow in the future and seek an effective resolution of implementation issues. In this context Peters and Waterman (1982, p. 53) note: “Pathfinding is essentially an aesthetic, intuitive process, a design process. There is an infinity of alternatives that can be posed for design problems…From that infinity there are plenty of bad ideas, and here the rational approach is helpful in sorting out the chaff. One is usually left with a large remaining set of good design ideas, however, and no amount of analysis will choose among them, for the final decision is essentially one of taste.” Clearly, like Ohmae (1982) Peters and Waterman (1982) are prepared to give some flexibility to management in the way they assess strategic alternatives. Carefully appraising Peters and Waterman’s (1982) contribution in this area, their appreciation of intuition is stronger than that of Ohmae (1982) whilst also giving flexibility in the use of rational analysis to managers. Peters (Reimann and Ramanujam, 1992) has also expressed admiration for the bias to action and autonomous decision-making processes of firms like 3M. Providing autonomy to line managers is an important element in facilitating thought and action concurrently, increasing the probability of 6 superior implementation in an uncertain environment. However, Peters and Waterman’s (1982) failure to see the future with any real precision leaves one to ponder the financial and operational cost of the bias to action and “messy” learning activities associated with this approach to strategy. Stacey (1993) argues the strategic situation confronted by the firm is unique, ambiguous, paradoxical and presents varying levels of uncertainty dependent on the contextual environment (Boisot, 1995). This issue of uncertainty provides a challenge for managers as we have seen in that during their day-to-day activities they must decide when to embrace and when to step away from the firm’s accepted frameworks, customs, rules and procedures to address strategic situations (Stacey, 1993). Strategic situations by definition contain a given level of uncertainty and ambiguity for managers and organisation’s as these issues have not been encountered before. As a result managers need to develop new ways of dealing with particular situations. Stacey (1993, p. 19) elaborates on this: “Step-by-step thinking completed before action is taken is in fact impossible in unique situations. Instead, managers must think while they act and they have to think, not in a step-by-step way towards a known goal, but in irregular ways proceeding from one analogy to another, in order to frame and find both goals and ways of achieving them.” He goes on to observe that strategic situations inevitably create conflict within the organisation and as a result strategic thinking needs to consider cultural and political issues within the firm. He sees strategic thinking as drawing on a wide area in terms of subject matter including strategic management, cognitive psychology, group dynamics and systems theory. Stacey’s (1993) position appears stronger than the Peters and Waterman (1982) contribution in that Stacey (1993) exhibits a broader appreciation of the issues associated with effective strategic thinking and effectively integrating the “hard” and “soft” organisational factors identified in the McKinsey “۷- S Model” (Peters and Waterman, 1982, p. 10) to enhance firm performance. His offering is positioned also to the right of the continuum’s centre whilst also providing flexibility for managers in resolving strategic problems. Bates and Dillard Jnr. (1993. p. 103) discussing the benefits of strategic thinking through multi-level teams relate effective strategic thinking to “intuitive ability, 7 mental elasticity, abstract thinking, tolerance of risk, and tolerance for ambiguity”. They stress the need for staff involved in strategy to have both ability and motivation, and these attributes are reflected in the team members exhibiting both ambition and social skills. Without these attributes a staff member is unlikely to make an effective contribution to the strategy process. However, this is also a limited perspective as a consistent theme in the strategy literature (Liedtka, 1998a, 1998b; Wilson, 1994, 1998) is that all staff can be trained to think strategically, not certain staff only as Bates and Dillard Jr (1993) assert. Bates and Dillard Jr’s (1993) input is one of the more extreme views favouring intuition on the continuum. Henry Mintzberg has made a strong contribution to the literature in the strategy field. In his classic Harvard Business Review article “The rise and fall of strategic planning” (۱۹۹۴, p. 108) Mintzberg clearly asserts his perception of strategic thinking as favouring the right brain side of the right brain/left brain continuum. Strategic thinking: